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EQUALITY FOR MEN AND WOMEN, THREE
APPROACHES: FRONTIERO, THE EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT, AND THE MONTANA EQUAL
DIGNITIES PROVISION
Joan Uda
INTRODUCTION
There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism'
which, in practical effect, put women not on a pedestal, but in a cage.'

The past ten years have seen an unprecedented momentum toward
full equality under the law for women. Probably no area of the law
is changing more rapidly or more substantively than women's rights.
In the words above, from Frontierov. Richardson,2 Mr. Justice Brennan
rejected the traditional legal attitudes toward women,3 expressed one
hundred years earlier in Bradwell v. Illinois:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life....
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.'
5
This note will attempt to analyze the significance of Frontiero,
and the pending Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution, 6 particularly as they relate to the potential impact of the Equal
7
Dignities Provision in the 1972 Montana Constitution.
FRONTIERO: SEX CLASSIFICATIONS
Sharron Frontiero, a married air force lieutenant, applied for dependent's benefits, including housing and medical benefits, for her husband, a full-time college student. Her application was refused because

she was unable, as required by federal statute,8 to demonstrate that she
provided more than one-half of her husband's support. 9 Such benefits
'Frontiero v. Richardson, 93 S. Ct. 1764, 1769 (1973).
2Id.
",,... [T]hroughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society
was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave
codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit
in their own names, and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity
to hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their own children." Id.
'83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873).
5Frontiero v. Richardson, supra note 1.
OThe text of the Equal Rights Amendment [hereinafter cited E.R.A.] appears infra
note 49.
7MONT. CONST. art. II,
§ 4. The text of the Equal Dignities provision appears infra
note 77.
137 UNITED STATES CODE § 401 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited U.S.0.] and 10 U.S.C.
§ 1071 et seq. (1970).
OFrontiero v. Richardson, supra note 1 at 1767.
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are automatically granted to the wives of male members of the service.
Lieutenant Frontiero and her husband filed suit in federal district court,
alleging that this statutory distinction between male and female members
unreasonably discriminated on the basis of sex, in violation of the Due
10
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The Frontieros claimed that the statutes discriminated in two ways:
first, in procedure, because women members were required to prove their
husbands' dependency, but the same burden was not placed upon men
members; and second, in substance, because men members who did not
provide over one-half of their wives' support received benefits, but
similarly situated women members did not." The Frontieros sought a
permanent injunction to prevent enforcement of these statutes against
them and members of their class, and an award of back pay for depend2
ency allowances denied to Lieutenant Frontiero.1
The three-judge federal district court denied relief,' 3 concluding
that "the statutory scheme on a whole is not one which classifies on
the basis of sex,'1 4 and that "there is a rational basis for the different
treatment accorded male and female members in [this] narrow context."' 5 The rational basis asserted by the government was "administrative convenience": Congress could reasonably have decided that it
was cheaper to require women members to prove a spouse's dependency
6
than to grant such benefits automatically as they did for men members.'
To reach its result, the three-judge court appears to have relied
entirely upon traditional equal protection principles. Under these principles, for a statutory classification to withstand an equal protection
attack, it is only necessary that: (1) the classification be reasonable,
in the sense that it is based upon real differences' 7 and is not arbitrary ;18
(2) that the object of the classification is to further a purpose or policy

"°This is, of course, an equal protection and not a due process claim, but the United
States Supreme Court has held that: " [W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no
equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to
be violative of due process.' '' Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964).
"Frontiero v. Richardson, supra note 1 at 1767.
2Id.
"Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201 (M.D.Ala. 1972). One of the three judges
dissented.
4
Id. at 207. "It seems clear that the reason Congress established a conclusive presumption in favor of married service men was to avoid imposing on the uniformed
services a substantial administrative burden of requiring actual proof from some
200,000 male officers and over 1,000,000 enlisted men that their wives were actually
dependent upon them. The question presented here then is whether the price for
enjoying this administrative benefit fails to justify the different treatment of married service women.)
15
1d.
1

lId.

'-Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 376, 406
dissenting).
"'Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1972).
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which is within the permissible functions of government;19 and (3) that
the difference upon which the classification is based bears some relation2"
21
to the accomplishment of the governmental purpose or policy.
22
Thus, these equal protection principles do not forbid classification.
They merely require that, on the surface, the classification is such that
it may be assumed the legislature acted in the exercise of "legislative
judgment and discretion. '23 This is what has been termed "old" equal
protection, under which the standard of judicial review is "minimal
'24
scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact.

Specifically, the three-judge court drew its standard for review
from a welfare benefits case 25 in which the United States Supreme Court
reenunciated and applied the "old" equal protection test:
"A statutory discrimination will not be set aside
if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it."'
Further:
If the classification has some "reasonable basis," it does not offend
the Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with
mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results in some inequal,
ity."

The Frontieros appealed. On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court applied significantly different equal protection principles, "in
effect, [serving] notice that sex discrimination by law would no longer
escape rigorous constitutional review. ' 28 The Court's first step was to
29
find that the statutory classifications were solely sex-based.
Then Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas, White, and
Marshall, went one giant step further, concluding that:
[C]lassifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon
race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must
therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."
"Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 17 at 406; Reed v. Reed, supra
note 18 at 76.
"°Mr. Justice Brandeis uses the term ''substantial relation'' in Quaker City Cab Co. v.
Pennsylvania, supra note 17 at 406, but this seems misleading since later cases require only "some" relation-often quite tenuous. E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, supra
note 1 at 1768.
"Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 17 at 406; Reed v. Reed, supra
note 18 at 76.
"Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 17 at 405.
1Id. Also see the quotation from Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970),
cited infra note 26.
ftGunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Mode
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
'Dandridge v. Williams, supra note 23.
"Id. at 485.
2Id.
"Ginsburg, The Need for the Equal Rights Amendment, 59 A.B.A. J. 1013, 1015 (1973).
"Frontiero v. Richardson, supra note 1 at 1771. This is not explicit in the concurring
opinions, but is surely implicit.
8id. by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1974
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Classifications which are deemed "suspect" are treated as inherently
unreasonable, 3 1 because they are "constitutionally an irrelevance, like
race, creed, or color. '32 Further, the "suspect" status automatically
carries with it the "strict" standard of judicial review, which effectively
shifts the burden of proof from the challenger to the state or federal
government. Under the "minimal scrutiny" of the "old" equal protection,
the challenger must show that the classification is arbitrary 33 or has no
rational relation to the legislative purpose.3 4 "Strict scrutiny," however,
places the burden on the defender of the classification, to show not only
that it is reasonable, but that it is necessary to some "overriding" state
35
purpose.
"Strict scrutiny" is the essence of "new" equal protection.3" The
principles of "new" equal protection do not dictate that a legislature
can never discriminate on a "suspect" basis. They do make clear, however, that permissible instances of such discrimination are not common;
the state or federal government can rarely, if ever, carry its "new"
37
equal protection burden.
In Frontiero,8 the government conceded that the statutory discrimination between men and women served no purpose other than "administrative convenience." 3 9 This, though entitled to some weight, fell far
short of meeting the government's burden.
A COmMENTARY ON THE CoNsTiTuTioN 0r THE UNITED STATES, 504-07
(1968).
"Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring).
$Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 464 (1957). "One who assails the classification in
such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary."
"Frontiero v. Richardson, supra note 1 at 1768, and supra note 20.
1'In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969), the Court said, "...
[A]ny
classification which serves to penalize the exercise of ,[a constitutional right],
unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.'' It should be noted that
the term ''compelling state interest''
usually appears in equal protection cases dealing with "fundamental rights" rather
than ''suspect classifications.'' Both invoke ''strict judicial scrutiny,'' however,
indicating that whether the state's interest must be ''compelling,'' ''overriding,''
or something generally equivalent is a matter of language rather than substance.
See, Houle, Compelling State Interest Vs. Mere Rational Classification: The Practitioner's Equal Protection Dilemma, 3 URDAN L. 375 (1971), which treats "fundamental rights" and "suspect classification" as two branches of the "compelling
state interest" doctrine.
In Frontiero, supra note 1 at 1772, the Court indicates what is required: "In
order to satisfy the demands of strict judicial scrutiny, the Government must demonstrate, for example, that it is actually cheaper to grant increased benefits with
respect to all male members, than it is to determine which male members are in fact
entitled to such benefits and to grant increased benefits only to those members whose
wives actually meet the dependency requirement. Here, however, there is substantial
evidence that, if put to the test, many of the wives of male members would fail
to qualify for benefits.''
"For discussion of ''old,'' ''new,'' and ''newer" equal protection, see Gunther,
supra note 24 at 8.
'Gunther, supra note 24 at 8, notes that "new equal protection applies scrutiny that
is 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact."
MFrontiero v. Richardson, supra note 1 at 1771.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/8
'Recently the Court has not been friendly to government arguments based on admin- 4
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On the contrary, any statutory scheme which draws a sharp line
between the sexes, solely for ...achieving administrative convenience,
necessarily commands "dissimilar treatment for men and women who
are . .. similarly situated," and therefore involves the "very kind of
arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the [Constitution] ... ,1,0

Eight to one, the Court held these statutes in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, "insofar as they require a
41
female member to prove the dependency of her husband."
Sex is not yet a "suspect" classification under the federal Constitution, however, because only four Justices were willing to take that
step. Mr. Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment, saying only that
"the statutes before us work an invidious discrimination in violation
of the Constitution. '42 Mr. Justice Powell, joined by the Chief Justice
and Mr. Justice Blackmun, also concurred in the judgment, based on
Reed v. Reed,43 which invalidated an Idaho probate statute preferring
men over women for appointment as estate administrators. In Reed, the
Court purported to apply the "old" equal protection principles, 4 4 but its
result, like that of the concurring Justices in Frontiero,45 indicates that
in fact its review standard was significantly more rigorous than "old"

equal protection's "minimal scrutiny.

'46

Mr. Justice Powell specifically refused to hold sex a "suspect"
classification. This was, he said, not only because Reed "abundantly
supports our decision today," but also because such "premature" and

"unnecessary" action would preempt a major political decision pending
before the state legislatures: consideration of the Equal Rights Amendment.

47

Frontiero plainly indicates, however, that until final ratification of
the E.R.A., sex discrimination plaintiffs will find some sort of "careful"
scrutiny by the Court, even though a full majority is not yet ready to
48
apply "strict" scrutiny.

istrative convenience. "...
And when we enter the realm of 'strict judicial scrutiny,'
there can be no doubt that 'administrative convenience' is not a shibboleth, the mere
recitation of which dictates constitutionality.'' Frontiero v. Richardson, supra note 1
at 1772. The Court cites Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) and Carrington
v. Bash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965). The same sort of result has also been reached in cases
apparently not applying "strict scrutiny," however; e.g., Reed v. Reed, supra note
18; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
"OFrontiero v. Richardson, supra note 1 at 1772.
4id. Ginsburg, supra note 28 at 1015, n. 26, points out: "Automatic qualification of
wives as dependent, whether or not they are in fact, but requirement of proof of
actual dependency of husbands is the prevailing pattern in federal and state employment benefits and social insurance legislation.'
"Id. at 1772-73.
"Reed v. Reed, supra note 18.
"See discussion in text, supra notes 17-27.
"Frontiero v. Richardson, aupra note 1.
"Reed v. Reed, supra note 18 at 75-76.
17Frontiero v. Richardson, supra note 1 at 1773.
"Gunther, supra note 24 at 20-24, lays out a "model"
for what he calls "newer"
Published
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THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex."'

The full legal impact of the Equal Rights Amendment cannot be
assessed until it becomes law and its basic principles are enunciated by
the United States Supreme Court. At least two of those principles are
immediately apparent, however.
First, the E.R.A. is addressed only to action by the state or federal
government; it will not, and is not intended to, touch sheerly private
action. In this it parallels the Fourteenth Amendment:
§ 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid a private
party, not acting against a backdrop of state compulsion or involvement, to discriminate on the basis of race in his personal affairs
as an expression of his own personal predilections.'
The contours of "state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment
have been developed by extensive constitutional litigation, and though
these contours are neither static nor wholly clear in detail, they are
reasonably discernable in broad outline. 51 "Legislation," whether a
'52
statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation, involves "state action,
as does discriminatory application of legislation, even if on its face the

the Court says that it is applying "old"
equal protection, but seems actually to
apply a standard of review that is much more rigorous than under "old"
equal
protection, though less rigorous than under "new"
equal protection. Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1332 (1973), suggests that the Court openly acknowledge
what he considers a "sliding scale" approach: "The test in every case should be
to determine the extent to which constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent
on interests not mentioned in the Constitution. As the nexus between the specific
constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny
applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must be adjusted
accordingly. "I
' 0The E.R.A., which will become the 27th Amendment when adopted, was submitted
to the states on March 22, 1972. Adoption requires ratification by three-fourths of
the state legislatures. To date, thirty-three of the necessary thirty-eight have ratified it, including Montana, on January 21, 1974. Nebraska has attempted to withdraw its ratification, but Congress apparently has decided in the past that such
states will be counted toward ratification. See Ginsburg, supra note 28 at 1019.
The E.R.A. contains two additional sections:
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
OlAdickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 169 (1970).
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
"1The summary which follows is, of course, offered only as an indication of the present
contours of "state action.'
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/8
"See Turner v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350. (1962).
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legislation appears to be fair.55 If the action is taken by any officer or
agency of a state, "state action" is present, 54 even if the action is not
within the officer's or agency's scope of authority,55 or if it is a blatant
violation of state law.56
Private conduct can in some circumstances be reached, but only
where it is sufficiently intertwined with some sort of state action, 57 where
it occurs under a custom having the force of law, 58 or where it involves
a private party who has assumed functions which are essentially governmental in nature.5 9 In short, although the precise boundaries of
"state action" are not finely drawn, it is clear that § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment "erects no shield against merely private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful." 60
The great numbers of Fourteenth Amendment sex discrimination
cases already decided or presently working up through the federal and
state court systems are required to meet the same tests for "state action"
as any other Fourteenth Amendment claims. For example, in Millenson
v. New Hotel Monteleone,61 a woman claimed that denial of service in a
"men only" hotel grill, solely on the grounds that she was a woman,
violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, applying the standard "state action" tests, found that liquor
licensing by the state, and collection of state sales taxes, did not "so
intertwine the policies of the hotel with state authority that impermissible state action is present. ' 62 Given the express language of the E.R.A.,
which speaks only to the state and federal governments, there is no
reason to suppose that these tests will differ in any way under it.
Second, under the E.R.A., sex will immediately become a "suspect"
classification. According to Mr. Justice Brennan in Frontiero:
[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by ... birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would
seem to violate "the basic concept of our system that legal burdens
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility. .. ."
[Citation omitted] [W]hat differentiates sex from such non-suspect
statutes as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the
recognized suspect criteria, is that the characteristic frequently bears
no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. As a result,
statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of

"Yiek Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
uUnited States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
55owa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931).
5United States v. Raines, supra note 54.
"rBurton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
aAdickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., supra note 50.
"Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Amalgamated Food Employees Union v.
Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551,
conformed to 463 F.2d 1095 (1972).
"Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
-475 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1973).
OId. at 737.
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invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal
status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual
members.'
It should be noted again that Mr. Justice Brennan was joined by
three other Justices who were willing to hold sex a "suspect" classification under the Fourteenth Amendment." Once the state legislatures
have spoken to ratify the E.R.A., there is no doubt that the initial four
Justices will be joined by at least the three who worried in Frontiero
about preempting the states' decision.6 5
As everyone knows, there has been a great deal of heated public
and legislative debate on the potential effects of the E.R.A. In the
main, opponents of the Amendment express concern about maintaining
the so-called protective legislation for women: for example, laws which
prohibit or limit the situations in which women can tend bar, 6 which
limit the hours a woman can work, 67 or which limit the amount of weight
a woman can lift on the job.68 It is true that under the E.R.A. much of
this legislation will fall or be repealed, 69 but it is also true that much
of it has already fallen or been legislatively removed from the statute
books. 70 And, as the National Women's Party pointed out in 1926, shortly after the E.R.A. was first submitted to Congress:
Legislation that includes women but exempts men . . . limits the
woman worker's scope of activity . . . by barring her from economic
opportunity. Moreover, restrictive conditions [for women but not for
men] fortifies the harmful assumption that labor for pay is primarily
the prerogative of the male.'
If we are to end the truly invidious sex discrimination routinely prac-

OFrontiero v. Richardson, supra note 1 at 1770.
"Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall.
65In Frontiero v. Richardson, supra note 1 at 1773, Mr. Justice Powell, the Chief
Justice, and Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment, as did Mr. Justice
Stewart. Of Mr. Justice Stewart, who reached his concurrence in Frontiero merely
by labeling the discrimination "invidious,"
one commentator writes: "Further enlightenment on the review standard by which he measures sex differentials in the
law has been left for another day. In the meantime, lower courts may well assume
that Justice Stewart knows sex discrimination when he sees it, just as he 'knows
[hard-core pornography] when he sees it,' and accordingly conclude that at least five
Justices can be relied upon to closely scrutinize sex classifications."
Ginsburg,
Comment: Frontiero v. Richardson, 1 WoME_'s RIGHTS LAw REPORTER 2, 4 (1973).
8
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). But see SaiZ'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1,
485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
67Garneau v. Raytheon Co., 323 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mass. 1971); Vogel v. Trans World
Airlines, 346 F. Supp. 805 (W.D. Mo. 1971).
"Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph, 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969);
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
'Ginsburg, supra note 28 at 1014. Ginsburg notes that according to the solicitor
general, a recent computer search of the United States Code turned up 876 sections
with sex-based references. Montana laws which would be affected include support
obligations, Title 36 REvsED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited R.C.M.
1947]; domicile, R.C.M. 1947, § 83-303; and a number of others.
"E.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph, supra note 68; Garneau v.
v. Raytheon Co., supra note 67.
'Ginsburg, supra note 28 at 1018.
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ticed in America, most of the remaining sex-based protective legislation
72
should be eliminated.
As to legislation which accords real benefits to one sex or the other,
however, the remedy granted in Frontier 73 is instructive. Notably, the
Court did not eliminate the automatic benefits for male members of the
uniformed services, but rather extended those benefits to women on
the same terms.7 4 This supports what E.R.A. proponents have contended:
that statutes affording benefits on the basis of sex would be held to apply
equally to men and women,7 5 and only those which merely prohibited
76
or limited conduct would be invalidated.
MONTANA: EQUAL DIGNITIES UNDER THE LAW
Section 4. Individual Dignity. The dignity of the human being is
inviolable. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution
shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or
political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin
or condition, or political or religious ideas.'
The new Montana Equal Dignities provision appears potentially
more far-reaching than the E.R.A., although its contours must, of course,
be defined by the Montana supreme court. There appear to be substantial reasons for urging its full enforcement, however, and for arguing
before the Montana courts that its scope is as broad as its language
suggests.
The Constitutional Convention documents make clear the intent
underlying the Montana Declaration of Rights7 8 in general, and Section

" 'It is true, of course, that the position of women in America has improved markedly
in recent decades. Nevertheless, it can hardly be doubted that, in part because of
the high visibility of the sex characteristic, women still face pervasive, although at
times more subtle, discrimination in our educational institutions, on the job market
and, perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena." Frontiero v. Richardson,
aupra note 1 at 1770.
According to the Fact Sheet on the Earnings Gap put out in 1971 by the Women's
Bureau of the Employment Standards Administration, U.S. Department of Labor:
"Women who work at full-time jobs the year round earn, on the average, only
$3 for every $5 earned by similarly employed men ....
[T]he gap is greater than
it was fifteen years ago. From 64 percent in 1955, women's median wage or salary
income as a proportion of men's fell to 61 percent by 1959 and 1960 and since
then has fluctuated between 58 and 60 percent. Women's median earnings of $5,323
in 1970 were 59 percent of the $8,966 received by men."
Other Bureau statistics make the discrepancy even more clear. In 1970, women
with five years or more of college education earned a median income of $9,581 per
year, which is only a few dollars higher than the median of $9,567 per year for men
with a high school education.
In general, see Kanawitz, WoxmE AND THE LAW: THE UNr=sHE
REvOLUTION,
114-24 (1969).
"Frontiero v. Richardson, supra note 1.
"Id. at 1772, n. 25.
"Rosen v. Public Service Electric and Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973). Ginsburg,
supra note 28 at 1017.
"Reed v. Reed, supra note 18.
"MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4.
"MONT.
CoNST. art. II. at University of Montana, 1974
Published
by ScholarWorks
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4 in specific. First, the Declaration of Rights as a whole was intended
to be "the finest, most expansive declaration of rights enacted by any
'79
state of the United States.
As to Section 4:
The committee unanimously adopted this section with the intent of
providing a constitutional impetus for the eradication of public and
private discriminations based on race, color, sex, culture, social
origin or political or religious ideas.'
Sex was included among the forbidden categories because:
The committee felt that such inclusion was proper and saw no reason
for the state to wait for the adoption of the federal equal rights
amendment or any amendment which would not explicitly provide as
much protection as this provision.'
The Bill of Rights Committee expressed great concern with wording
Section 4 to make its scope as expansive as possible. The committee's
report was quite critical of results achieved under federal anti-discrimination efforts, and reveals that they deliberately modelled Section 4 on
provisions from other state constitutions which they felt came closest
to their goal of eradicating objectionable discrimination.8 2
Section 4 is, of course, clearly directed not only to state action, but
also to the wholly private conduct not reached by the Fourteenth Amendment or the proposed E.R.A. The everyday meaning of the words tells
us this,8 3 as do the Bill of Rights Committee Report,8 4 and the Constitutional Convention's floor debate on Section 4.
The intent of section four is simply to provide that every individual
in the state of Montana ...may pursue his inalienable rights without
having any shadows cast upon his dignity through unwarranted discrimination, and we submit that the concern of this . . . Convention

with respect to discrimination should not be reflected simply by having limitations upon the state and its agencies, but also by having
those ' same limitations upon the private agencies ... within ... the
state.
The floor debate suggests that these "private agencies" specifically include private employers and landlords, 6 but that there was no -'qtent
to interfere with the legitimate membership qualifications of private
8 7
social organizations_

8

iMontana Constitutional Convention, VII Transcript of Proceedings 5037 (1972)
[hereinafter cited Transcript of Proceedings].

1Id. at 5059.
slid. at 5060.
'
Montana Constitutional Convention Studies, Report Number 10, Bill of Rights 309-12

(1972) [hereinafter cited Report Number 10].

"'' Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution ...

''

[Empha-

sis added].
"Report Number 10, supra note 82 at 130-11.
'
Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 79 at 5063.
SId.
8'1d. at 5065-66.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/8
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Thus, questions may rise on particular fact situations as to precisely
which private actions are covered by Section 4. These questions really
seem to go, however, to the issue of what constitutes a "civil or political
right," and not to the issue of whether a particular private party is
covered by Section 4. Given the wording and expressed intent of Section
4, it should not matter who infringes a protected right, if the right itself
is protected.
The really difficult question is, of course: What is the meaning of
the phrase, "civil or political rights"?
A generally acceptable definition of "political" rights is not hard to
find:
"Political" rights consist in the power to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, such
as the right of citizenship, that of suffrage, the right to hold public
office, and the right of petition."

A definition of "civil" rights is more elusive. During floor debate
on Section 4, the question came up: "Aren't civil rights things that
the legislature has to deal with?" The answer was masterful understatement:
Basically... that is correct and I do not think that at this time in
America we have an all-inclusive definition of civil rights.'
Generally, definitions break into the following, and overlapping,
categories:
(1) rights [which] belong to every citizen of the state or country, or,
in a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with
the organization or administration of government. They include the
rights of property, marriage, protection by the laws, freedom of
contract, trial by jury, etc.'
(2) rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.'
(3) rights secured to citizens of the United States by the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, and by various acts
of Congress made in pursuance thereof."
The floor debate on Section 4 provides some illumination as to what
rights Section 4 was intended to cover:
There is no intent within this particular section to do anything other
than remove the apparent type of discrimination that all of us object
to with respect to employment, to rental practices, to actual association in matters that are public or matters that tend to be somewhat quasi-public."
DIcTIoNARY 1487-88 (4th ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited BLACK'S].
Winnett v. Adams, 71 Neb. 817, 99 N.W. 681, 684 (1904).
"Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 79 at 5066.
"BLACK'S, supra note 88 at 1487. Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705, 726-27 (1973); Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 441 (1968); Winnett v. Adams, supra note 88 at
684.
"BLACK'S, supra note 88 at 1487. Iron Workers Local No. 67 v. Hart, 191 N.W.2d
758, 771 (1971); Sowers v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm., 20 Ohio Misc. 115, 252 N.E.2d
"SBLACK'S LAw

463, 475 (1969); State of Iowa v. Railroad Co., 37 F. 498, 3 L.R.A. 554 (C.C.S.D.
Iowa 1889).
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875); State
of Iowa v. Railroad Co., supra note 91.
STranscript of Proceedings, supra note 79 at 5063.
"BLACK'S, supra note 88 at 1487.
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The debate further indicates that the scope of protected rights under
Section 4 was intended to be at least as broad as those encompassed by
the federal Equal Protection Clause,94 and that "anything that falls
95
within the realm of common sense" should be covered.
In light of the above, it should be possible to argue that the scope
of rights protected under Section 4 is at minimum as broad as those
protected by the federal Constitution and Acts of Congress. Although
the United States Supreme Court has apparently never attempted an
"all-inclusive" definition of what rights are federally protected, it is
clear that the phrase "rights, privileges or immunities secured ... by the
Constitution or laws of the United States"9 6 sweeps up "all of the Con97
stitution and laws of the United States."
This would include "property" rights: "That rights in property are
basic civil rights has long been recognized."' 8 It would also include
those rights specifically enumerated by the Constitution and applied
to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment,9 9 such as freedom of speech
and press, 100 and "peripheral" rights which make the enumerated rights
more secure, 101 such as "the right of association,"'10 2 freedom of "in' 04
and the right to travel. 0 5
quiry," 10 3 the "right of privacy,"'
In addition, it would seem to include those rights specifically protected by Congress in civil rights legislation; for example, equality of
opportunity in employment, 06 right of equal pay for equal work, 0 7
freedom from discrimination in public accommodations,'" and all the
"peripheral" aspects of those rights, such as the right to participate in
an employer's pension plan free from discrimination on the basis of
sex. 10 9 In brief, any right which the courts are presently protecting under

01Id. at 5064.
9Id. at 5065.
"United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 797 (1966).
"Id.
"Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
"It has never been held that the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporates"
the federal
Bill of Rights, Amendments One through Eight, as a whole, but most have been
held, entirely or in part, to apply to the state through the Fourteenth Amendment.
10 0
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). A partial list of other such rights is:
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise of religion); Mapp V.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (the fourth amendment exclusionary rule); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right to counsel); Roe v. Wade,
supra note 90 (fourteenth amendment right to privacy in procreation).
"'Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
'O'Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
10"Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952).
1
0Roe v. Wade, supra note 90.
"'Shapiro v. Thompson, supra note 35.
10642 U.S.C. §2000e (1964).
1-729 U.S.C. § 206 (1963).
u942 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
1"Rosen v. Public Service Electric and Gas Co., supra note 75.
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the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and under federal civil
rights legislation would seem fairly classified as a "civil" right.
It may be, of course, that the Montana supreme court would decline
this interpretation of the scope of Section 4. The argument for a broad
reading of Section 4 is enhanced, however, by the many rights specifically enumerated in the 1972 Montana Constitution, including "inalienable rights" such as "the right of pursuing life's basic necessities,"11 0
freedom of religion,"' the right of privacy,"12 and freedom of speech,
118
expression, and press.
This argument is further supported by the Montana Freedom from
Discrimination statutes,' 4 in which the Montana legislature has declared:
The right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color,
sex, or national origin is ... a civil right. This right shall include,
but not be limited to:
(1) The right to obtain and hold employment without discrimination.
(2) The right to the full enjoyment of any of the accommodation
facilities or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation,
assemblage or amusement.'
By its terms, this act applies to almost any conceivable public place,
from public elevators and washrooms to places where medical or dental
care is offered and publicly supported nursery schools." 6 The act defines
"every person" in language no less broad than that of Section 4,117 and
9
8
details what is meant by "deny""1 and "full enjoyment.""
A number of states, although apparently not Montana, have interpreted the equal protection provisions of their constitutions to be coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 Among these is Michigan,
whose provision contains language strikingly similar to Montana's:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall
any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political rights or
be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of religion,
race, color or national origin.'
It is both possible and desirable, however, to argue that not only
is the scope of rights as broad under Section 4 as under the federal

n*MoNT. CoNsT.

art. II, § 3.

'MONT. CONST. art II, § 5.
2
n MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
"UMONT. CONST. art II, § 7.

-1 R.C.M. 1947, §§ 64-301 - 64-303.
"-R.C.M. 1947, § 64-301.
-0 R.C.M. 1947, § 64-302(5).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 64-302(1).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 64-302(2).
"9 R.C.M. 1947, § 64-302(3).
mLos Angeles County v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal.2d 378, 196 P.2d 773 (1948).
appeal dismissed 336 U.S. 929; Naudzius v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 234 N.W. 581
(1931); Town of Greenburgh v. Board of Sup'rs or Westchester County, 277
N.Y.S.2d 885, 53 Misc.2d 88, 277 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1967).
'fMICHIGAN CONSTiTU 0x, Art. I, § 2.
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the federal Constitution provides only the "miniConstitution, but that
122
mum" guarantees.
There are numerous reasons for so arguing. For one, the United
States Supreme Court sometimes feels bound to consider the differing
conditions that may prevail in various states, and thus will limit the
application of its holding, to give the states time to implement some
emerging constitutional principle. 123 The Court may also avoid a broad
constitutional decision in order that states may operate as a "laboratory"
for experimentation. 24 Further, as some commentators point out, 125 to
find the state bill of rights merely coextensive with the federal bill of
rights robs the state bill of rights of substance, making it sheer duplication.126 Finally, it is possible that the United States Supreme Court
lessen its regard for
will, in the near or distant future, significantly 27
the expansion and protection of individual rights.
Thus, it seems wise to urge the Montana courts toward "judicial
activism," particularly in light of the "expansive" intent underlying
Section 4 and the Declaration of Rights as a whole.
CONCLUSION
Legal protection for women's rights is increasing rapidly,' 28 and the
impetus for passage of the E.R.A. suggests that this trend will continue

until women achieve total equality under the law. Meanwhile, Frontiero'21 9
will, no doubt, spur more women's rights litigation. 30 Frontiero also puts
the country dramatically on notice that the old "minimal" scrutiny of
sex classifications is dead,' 3 ' and suggests that until the E.R.A. is

12 2Fine, Matsakis and Spector, Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State
Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. CIV. RTS.-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 271

(1973); Countryman,

The

Role of a Bill of Rights in a Modern State Constitution, 45 WASH. L. REV. 454
(1970).
'"New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"ANew State Ice Co. v. Liebman, supra note 123 at 311.
InSee the sources cited supra note 122.
228Fine, Matsakis and Spector, supra note 122 at 284. Of course in Montana, Section 4
of the 1972 Constitution's Declaration of Rights should in any event extend these
protections to private action.
""United States v. Robinson, 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 94 S. Ct. 488
(1973). These are criminal procedure cases which seem significantly to expand an
officer's authority to conduct a full scale body search after arresting a person for driving without a valid driver's license. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct.
2607 (1973), Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973), and companion
within the comcases allow local authorities to set standards for what is "obscene"
munity. This constriction of individual rights is not discernible in many other
areas, however. See Gunther, supra note 24.
mSee Ginsburg, supra note 28.
2Frontiero v. Richardson, supra note 1.
13'Ginsburg, supra note 28 at 1015.
laId.
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fully implemented, the Court will continue its new regard for women's
rights.' 32
In the meantime, Montana need not take a back seat to any state
in the nation. Montana was, after all, among the first states to grant
women the ballot-in 1914, five years before the Nineteenth Amendment
granted this right to all American women. Montana also sent the first
woman to Congress: Jeanette Rankin, in 1916. This is a fine tradition,
and passage of the 1972 Montana Constitution makes clear that it
should-and hopefully will-continue.

'Ginsburg, supra note 65 at 3-4.
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